Noblis

Noblis
3.80
Noblis Logo
940
We’re a nonprofit science, technology, and strategy organization dedicated to creating forward-thinking technical and advisory solutions in the public interest, for the best of reasons.
Would you work here?
Culture & Value: 84%
Senior Leadership: 72%
Salary & Benefits: 88%
Career Growth: 74%
Work / Life Balance: 88%
Recommended: 81%
Featured Review
Good Company!

Pros: -Great Pay. -Good Management. I thought they always handled everything well. -Management does try to look out for their employees.

Cons: -Contract work; much less job security. -Once you are terminated there are very few opportunities internal. -Most jobs are based or around D.C. -Low career opportunities as employment is contractually driven.

Sound like a cool place to work?

Reach out and let them know why you think they are awesome!

Send an Introduction
Jobs
Events - In Beta: we're still testing the best way to get event info for companies :)
  • Join us for pizza at 6:00 pm in Noblis' offfice space with the meeting starting at approximately 6:30 pm and presentation at 7:00 pm.   

    Free for INCOSE members and non-members.

    U.S. citizens only. Non-U.S. citizens, please register to attend at the McLean location.

     Enterprise Risk Management: A Powerful New Management Tool

     “What are the risks that could prevent our organization from meeting its objectives?” Answering this simple question allows leaders and managers to identify and address major risks that could harm their organization and its performance. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) helps to improve the culture of a private firm or government agency to enhance the flow of information, up and down the hierarchy, across silos, and with stakeholders, so that organizations consider not only the risks they already manage, but also major risks that may emerge in today’s complex environment.

      Thomas H. Stanton

     Thomas H. Stanton is a past president of the Association for Federal Enterprise Risk Management (www.AFERM.org), and a former member of the federal Senior Executive Service. He teaches on the adjunct faculty of Johns Hopkins University and is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration. His book, Why Some Firms Thrive While Others Fail: Governance and Management Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Oxford University Press, 2012) has just been translated into Chinese. Mr. Stanton co-edited the first book on ERM in government, Managing Risk and Performance: A Guide for Government Decision Makers (Wiley & Sons, 2014), and is currently working on a second one. Many of his writings can be found at www.thomas-stanton.com


    View Event
  • Threats to global health security continue to evolve due to the changing nature of conflict, advances in science and technology, globalization, and the growing threat posed by emerging infectious diseases and pandemics. Pandemics, Bioterrorism and Global Health Security: From Anthrax to Zika is a three-day, non-credit summer workshop designed to introduce participants to the challenges facing the world at the intersection of national security, public health, and the life sciences. The workshop faculty are internationally recognized experts from the government, private sector, and academia who have been extensively involved with research and policy-making on public health, biodefense, and national security issues. The workshop is organized by the Biodefense Graduate Program at the Schar School of Policy and Government and will be held at the Schar School's campus in Arlington, Virginia on July 18-20, 2018.

     

    Private and public organizations face a number of challenges in adapting to the changing global biosecurity landscape. The spectrum of biological threats is diverse, including naturally occurring disease outbreaks such as SARS, Zika, and Ebola, lapses in biosafety, dual-use research of concern, and the threat of bioterrorism. A severe disease outbreak, whether natural or man-made, can affect not just public health, but also public safety and national security. Pandemics and bioterrorist attacks will confront government agencies and the private sector with the need to make high-impact decisions with limited information during a rapidly evolving situation. Further complicating this domain is the dual-use nature of biology: the knowledge, skills, and technology developed for legitimate scientific and commercial purposes can be misused by those with hostile intent. Research with dangerous pathogens and the development of advanced biotechnologies such as synthetic biology and genome editing poses a dilemma for policy-makers and researchers who seek to maximize the benefits of such research while minimizing the risks. Thus, public health, law enforcement and national security agencies, the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, and the academic life sciences community need to develop new types of expertise, adopt new types of risk assessment and risk management strategies, and learn to collaborate with each other.

     

    Implementing these new priorities will require substantial organizational learning and change. But large organizations have deeply embedded professional norms and organizational culture that make them resistant to change, even during times of crisis. Each organization responds with its own routines, and its own distinctive view of “the threat,” which dilutes new initiatives, encourages stovepiping, and impedes effective collaboration. These organizational tendencies grow even more pronounced during times of declining budgets. Thus, while the need for collaboration is great, the potential for differing organizational styles to produce conflict is high.

     

    The 1976 swine flu scare, 2001 anthrax letter attacks, SARS and avian influenza outbreaks, 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015-2017 Zika outbreak provide rich case studies of how government agencies and international organizations have struggled to address novel biological threats, make high-impact decisions with limited information, and work effectively with new partners. The lessons from these cases are broadly applicable to both public and private organizations seeking to address current and emerging biosecurity risks.

     

    Features

    • Syllabus and reading materials
    • Social hour after first day of course
    • Light breakfast, coffee, and lunch provided on all days
    • Certificate of Attendance

     

    Courses Objectives

    • Identify the range of biological threats and assess the risks they pose to public health and national security
    • Describe impediments to organizational change and identify strategies for overcoming these obstacles.
    • Examine lessons learned from the SARS and avian flu outbreaks, the 2009 influenza pandemic, and the 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak.
    • Explore the dual-use dilemma and how to balance the benefits of advanced biotechnologies against the safety and security risks they can pose.
    • Investigate the growing importance of biotechnology to the national economy, domestic and international risks to biotechnology innovation, and legal, policy, and regulatory measures for safeguarding the bioeconomy.
    • Understand the technical, political, regulatory, and financial obstacles to developing new medical countermeasures for bioterrorist and pandemic threats.

     

    Who Should Attend

    Professionals and academics, both domestic and international, in public health, the life sciences, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, international affairs, law enforcement, emergency management, and national security who have responsibilities for preventing, preparing for, or responding to pandemics, bioterrorism, and other threats to global health security.

     

    Past participants have come from a range of government agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Food and Drug Administration, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of the Army, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory; private and non-profit organizations such as CRDF Global, Battelle Memorial Institute, Emergent Biosolutions, Booz Allen Hamilton, BAE Systems, Engility, Noblis, and Quest Diagnostics; universities and think tanks such as Virginia Tech, Kent State University, University of South Florida, Institute for Defense Analysis, and MITRE; and foreign countries, including the Center for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness in Denmark, the Biosecurity Office of the Netherlands, the Rwanda Ministry of Agriculture, and the Philippine National Police Force.

     

    Registration

    Please note that we will only be accepting payment by credit card for this event.

    Prior to May 1, the course fee is $1,100. After May 1, the course fee is $1,200. Discounts are available for George Mason University faculty, students, and alum and for groups of three or more from the same organization. If you qualify for one of these discounts or have any questions regarding registration, please email biodefense@gmu.edu.

     

    *Cancellation Policy: Refunds will be available if cancelled prior to the start to the start of the workshop (July 18, 2018).

     

    Logistics

    The summer workshop will be held on July 18-20, 2018 on the Arlington campus of the Schar School of Policy and Government. The Schar School is located in Founder’s Hall at 3351 Fairfax Drive in Arlington, VA. The school is conveniently located two blocks from the Virginia Square-GMU Metro station on the Orange Line. Garage parking is also available.

     

    List of Instructors

    David R. FranzDavid R. Franz, DVM, PhD, served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty and retired as colonel. He served as commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as deputy commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to joining the Command, he served as group veterinarian for the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). His current standing committee appointments include the Department of Health and Human Services National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, the National Research Council Board on Life Sciences, and the Senior Technical Advisory Committee of the National Biodefense Countermeasures Analysis Center. Dr. Franz was the chief inspector on three United Nations Special Commission biological warfare inspection missions to Iraq and served as technical advisor on long-term monitoring. He also served as a member of the first two US-UK teams that visited Russia in support of the Trilateral Joint Statement on Biological Weapons and as a member of the Trilateral Experts’ Committee for biological weapons negotiations. Dr. Franz was technical editor for the Textbook of Military Medicine on Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare released in 1997. He serves as a Senior Mentor to the Program for Emerging Leaders at the National Defense University. He also serves on the Board of Integrated Nano-Technologies, LLC. Dr. Franz holds an adjunct appointment as Professor for the department of Diagnostic Medicine and Pathobiology at the College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University. The current focus of his activities relates to the role of international engagement in the life sciences as a component of national security policy. Dr. Franz holds a DVM from Kansas State University and a PhD in physiology from Baylor College of Medicine.

     

     

    Robert House, PhD, MPH, is Senior Vice President of Government Contracts for Ology Bioservices, Inc., a contract manufacturing and development organization specializing in products for infectious diseases. He is also President and Owner of Venema Consulting LLC, a private consulting practice specializing in vaccines, immunology, toxicology and infectious disease. Prior to his current positions, he was President of DynPort Vaccine Company LLC (DVC), a biotechnology firm in Frederick, MD. He has also worked at Covance Laboratories in Madison, WI, and IIT Research Institute in Chicago, IL, where he managed highly successful programs in immunotoxicology research and testing. Dr. House has more than 15 years’ direct experience in US Government contracting.

    Dr. House earned his Master of Science in Public Health and Ph.D. degrees in Medical Parasitology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Public Health. He is the author or co-author of more than 100 journal articles, book chapters and books covering immunology, toxicology, infectious disease and biodefense. He is an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University and a Fellow in the Academy of Toxicological Sciences.

     

     

    Gregory D. KoblentzGregory D. Koblentz, PhD, MPP, is an Associate Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University. During 2012-2013, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Koblentz is also a member of the Scientist Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington. He previously worked at Georgetown University, the Executive Session for Domestic Preparedness at Harvard University, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2009) and co-author of Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). He serves on the editorial boards of Nonproliferation Review, World Medical and Health Policy, and Global Health Governance. His teaching and research interests focus on international security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and homeland security. He received his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, his Master in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and his BA from Brown University. For more information, see https://schar.gmu.edu/about/faculty-directory/gregory-koblentz


     

    Jens H. Kuhn, MD, PhD, PhD, MS, is a Research Leader at Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, OH, USA, tasked as the Virology Lead (Contractor) at NIH/NIAID/DCR’s Biosafety Level 4 facility, the Integrated Research Facility at Fort Detrick (IRF-Frederick) in Frederick, MD, USA. Dr. Kuhn specializes in highly virulent viral human and animal pathogens. He is the author of “Filoviruses: A Compendium of 40 Years of Epidemiological, Clinical, and Laboratory Studies” (Vienna: Springer, 2008) and co-author of “The Soviet Biological Weapons Program—A History” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), and has studied and worked in Germany, Italy, Malta, Russia, South Africa, and South Korea. In the US, he rotated through or worked at Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA; the Arthropod-borne Infectious Disease Laboratory (AIDL) in Fort Collins, CO; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, GA; and the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Frederick, MD. Dr. Kuhn was the first western scientist with permission to work in a former Soviet biological warfare facility, SRCVB "Vektor" in Siberia, Russia, within the US Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Dr. Kuhn was a contributor to the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland’s Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project and a member of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation’s CBW Scientist Working Group. He is currently a Subcommittee Chair and Member of the Executive Committee of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV), Chair of the ICTV Bunyavirales and Filoviridae Study Groups, and a member of the ICTV Arenaviridae, Bornaviridae, Nairoviridae, and Nyamiviridae Study Groups. He furthermore serves as a Subject Matter Expert for NCBI for all mononegaviruses as a member of the NCBI Genome Annotation Virus Working Group and the database RefSeq. Dr. Kuhn is a member of the editorial boards of 10 journals, and has been a peer reviewer for more than 60 journals, including Cell, Cell Host & Microbe, Emerging Infectious Diseases, JAMA, The Lancet. Infectious Diseases, Nature, Nature Microbiology, Nature Protocols, PLoS Pathogens, Science, and Journal of Virology. Dr. Kuhn also was a member of the 2009-2011 US National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on “Animal Models for Assessing Countermeasures to Bioterrorism Agents”; and was part of several AAAS and US State Department bioengagement efforts in the BMENA Region, Turkey, and the NIS countries. Dr. Kuhn can be found on LinkedIn at www.linkedin.com/pub/jens-h-kuhn/1b/817/72 and on ResearchGate at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jens_Kuhn.

     

     

    Sanford L. Weiner is a Research Associate in the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a Visiting Fellow at Imperial College, University of London. For several decades he has done international comparative policy studies of public health agencies, and research on national security policies and environmental policies. He has published on policymaking at the Centers for Disease Control, the phase-out of CFCs, toxic substance control, and innovation in the Air Force. He is currently studying responses to pandemic flu in Europe and the United States, and the politics of alternative energy projects. He directs a Professional Education summer course at MIT on “Technology, Innovation and Organizations.” He has also taught in professional education courses for the Royal Society Technology Fellows (London), the National University of Singapore, UC San Diego, and in Stockholm. Before MIT he was on the research staffs of the School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley, the Health Policy Center at Brandeis, and the Harvard School of Public Health.

     

     

    Edward YouEdward You is a Supervisory Special Agent in the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Biological Countermeasures Unit. Mr. You is responsible for creating programs and activities to coordinate and improve FBI and interagency efforts to identify, assess, and respond to biological threats or incidents. These efforts include expanding FBI outreach to the Life Sciences community to address biosecurity. Before being promoted to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Mr. You was a member of the FBI Los Angeles Field Office Joint Terrorism Task Force and served on the FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team.

    Mr. You has also been directly involved in policy-making efforts with a focus on biosecurity. He is an active Working Group member of the National Security Council Interagency Policy Committee on Countering Biological Threats and an Ex Officio member of the NIH National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. He also serves on two committees for the National Academies of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine’s Forum on Microbial Threats and the Committee on Science, Technology, and Law’s Forum on Synthetic Biology.

    Prior to joining the FBI, Mr. You worked for six years in graduate research focusing on retrovirology and human gene therapy at the University of Southern California, Keck School of Medicine. He subsequently worked for three years at the biotechnology firm AMGEN Inc. in cancer research.

     

     

    Andrew Kilianski is currently a GMU professor and biological scientists at the DoD. His work focuses on combating current and future threats from weapons of mass destruction in addition to teaching classes on biosurveillance and virology in the GMU Biodefense graduate program. Dr. Kilianski was previously a National Research Council fellow with the US Army at Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. During his tenure at ECBC, his research focused on biosurveillance and the identification and characterization of novel agents that threaten today’s warfighter.  Dr. Kilianski’s research interests also included emerging viral pathogens and public health and biodefense policy, and he was selected as an Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative Fellow for 2015.  His research has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as PLoS Pathogens, Journal of Virology, and Emerging Infectious Diseases while also publishing multiple commentary and op-ed articles.  He received his Ph.D. in Microbiology and Immunology from Loyola University Chicago where his dissertation research involved uncoupling virus-host interactions important for coronavirus pathogenesis and developing antiviral compounds against emerging coronaviruses (SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV). During the workshop, Dr. Kilianski will be lecturing on biosurveillance and its role as an integral component of any biodefense strategy and how U.S. policy has mandated that such efforts be accelerated. He notes that “. This construct, and how the US and international entities engage in biosurveillance will be covered, as well as how recent Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks have tested the system. Emerging technologies and their role in biosurveillance will also be reviewed. Finally, paths toward integrated biosurveillance for the US and international communities will presented for group discussion discussion.”

     

    For more biodefense news, visit the Pandora Report

     

    Please contact biodefensegmu@gmail.com if you have any additional questions.

    View Event